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We analyze the hypothesis that some individuals on the autism spectrum may use visual 
mental representations and processes to perform certain tasks that typically developing 
individuals perform verbally.  We present a framework for interpreting empirical evidence 
related to this “Thinking in Pictures” hypothesis and then provide comprehensive reviews of 
data from several different cognitive tasks, including the n-back task, serial recall, dual task 
studies, Raven’s Progressive Matrices, semantic processing, false belief tasks, visual search 
and attention, spatial recall, and visual recall.  We also discuss the relationships between the 
Thinking in Pictures hypothesis and other cognitive theories of autism including 
Mindblindness, Executive Dysfunction, Weak Central Coherence, and Enhanced Perceptual 
Functioning. 
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Numerous individuals on the autism spectrum have posited that they tend to use visual mental 
representations instead of verbal ones (e.g. Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994).  In her well-known 
autobiographical book Thinking in Pictures, for example, Temple Grandin (2006) describes how 
her visual thinking style benefits her work in engineering design but also creates difficulties in 
understanding abstract concepts.  Among cognitive theorists in the autism research community, 
this “Thinking in Pictures” idea seems to have received limited focused and sustained 
consideration.  This relative lack of attention perhaps is due not only to the introspective nature 
of the above accounts but also because the hypothesis seems ill-defined.   
The purpose of this article is to refine one formulation of the Thinking in Pictures (TiP) 
hypothesis about cognition in autism and examine existing empirical evidence relating to this 
hypothesis, expanding on our previous work (Kunda & Goel, 2008).  Our formulation of this 
hypothesis has two main parts:   
 
Assumption: Typically developing (TD) individuals are, in general, able to use both visual 
and verbal mental representations. 
 
Hypothesis: A subset of individuals on the autism spectrum exhibits a disposition towards 
using visual mental representations (and a corresponding bias against using 
verbal mental representations). 
 
For the remainder of this paper, this (and only this) is what we mean by the TiP hypothesis.   
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Although for a time cognitive science debated whether visual mental representations even 
existed, the weight of evidence now seems to indicate that they do; they are usually described as 
analogical (i.e. having some structural correspondence to what they represent) and closely tied to 
perceptual mechanisms (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006).  In contrast, verbal mental 
representations are often described as propositional (Pylyshyn, 2002).  However, our reading of 
the literature on cognition in autism indicates that, like the literature on cognitive science in 
general, different interpretations of visual and verbal representations are often used in practice, 
often on a task-by-task basis.  We will pin down the precise meanings of visual and verbal in our 
discussions of individual tasks. 
General evidence suggesting a visual/verbal disparity among individuals on the autism 
spectrum can be found in studies of cognitive profiles, or patterns of verbal (V) versus nonverbal 
(NV) intelligence as measured by standardized IQ tests.  Some studies have noted a V < NV 
(lower verbal than nonverbal IQ) pattern among individuals on the autism spectrum (Lincoln, 
Courchesne, Kilman, Elmasian, & Allen, 1988), though such findings have not been universal 
(Klin, Volkmar, Sparrow, Cicchetti, & Rourke, 1995; Siegel, Minshew, & Goldstein, 1996).  
Joseph, Tager-Flusberg, and Lord (2002) found that, while children with autism were generally 
more likely to have a V-NV discrepancy in either direction than were TD children, children with 
autism having a V < NV pattern of abilities showed greater social impairment than the other 
children with autism, irrespective of absolute levels of verbal or general ability.  The 
distinctiveness of the V < NV profile, and also its association with variables of diagnostic 
interest, led the authors to conjecture that such a profile might indicate “an etiologically 
significant subtype of autism” that reflects fundamental changes in cognition and neuroanatomy 
in these individuals, rather than just the selective sparing of certain nonverbal abilities.    
A tendency to exhibit a V < NV profile is exactly what one might expect from an 
individual who thinks in pictures, with one important caveat:  the standard tasks used to measure 
verbal and nonverbal abilities in IQ tests have been selected through extensive study of 
neurotypical development and performance, and there is no guarantee that a test measuring a 
particular cognitive ability in TD individuals measures the same cognitive ability in individuals 
with autism, as there may be multiple different strategies that can be used to solve the same task.  
We return to this point in the following section.  
Other behavioral data from autism suggesting an over-reliance on visual representations 
span many different cognitive and task domains (e.g. Heaton, Ludlow, & Roberson, 2008; 
Joseph, Steele, Meyer, & Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Whitehouse, Maybery, & Durkin, 2006).  On 
the neurobiological side, Mottron et al. (2006) reported that across a variety of fMRI studies, 
individuals with autism tended to show increased brain activation in posterior, visual-perceptual 
brain regions and decreased activation in frontal brain regions often used for verbal processing. 
For the remainder of this article, we first describe what sorts of predictions about 
behavior can be made using the TiP hypothesis, and then we give several examples of relevant 
empirical data from behavior and neurobiology.  We conclude by discussing the relationship of 
the TiP hypothesis with several existing cognitive theories of autism, including Mindblindness, 
Executive Dysfunction, Weak Central Coherence, and Enhanced Perceptual Functioning. 
 
 
Effects of Thinking in Pictures on Behavior 
 
A simplistic consideration of the TiP hypothesis might lead to predictions that individuals with 
autism will show good performance on visual tasks and poor performance on verbal tasks.  
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However, there are two different ways to classify tasks as visual or verbal:  how a task can be 
solved (i.e. what sorts of mental representations and inferences are sufficient, but not necessary) 
and how tasks are typically solved (i.e. what sorts of mental representations and inferences do 
TD individuals generally use). 
Figure 1 illustrates the potential overlap between these two types of task classifications.  
The solid and dashed circles (A and B) represent tasks than can be solved visually or verbally, 
respectively, and their intersection (A ∩ B) represents tasks that can be solved either way.  For 
example, matching one of two very similar shades of red to a target red patch can be solved 
using visual representations but (probably) not using verbal ones, and so this task lies inside solid 
circle A but outside dashed circle B.  On the other hand, determining which of the words shoe or 
now rhymes with the word too can be solved using phonological verbal representations but not 
using visual ones, and so this task lies inside dashed circle B but outside solid circle A.  Finally, 
deciding which of two red and green colored patches matched a target red patch can be solved 
using either visual or verbal representations (e.g. by matching on visual hue or on linguistic 
label), and so this task lies in the intersection A ∩ B. 
The light grey and dark grey shaded regions (TA and TB) represent tasks that are 
typically solved visually or verbally, respectively.  The bulk of psychological evidence on how 
most humans solve cognitive tasks has given us TA and TB, by definition, and it is tempting to 
treat these classifications as the final answer on whether a task is visual or verbal.  However, for 
a typically verbal task in TB, if that task happens to also be solvable visually (i.e. lies within A ∩ 
B), it is possible that an individual disinclined to use verbal representations can use a 





Figure 1.  Task classifications according to how they can be solved (solid and dashed 
circles) and how they are typically solved (light and dark grey shadings). 
 
 
By making these distinctions, the performance of an individual on a given task (e.g. level 
of success) can be evaluated independently of their strategy selection (e.g. visual or verbal).  
Keeping this is mind, we now use the TiP hypothesis to make general predictions about the 
behavior of individuals with autism on three different types of tasks, as shown in Table 1. 
The first prediction is, perhaps, the least useful for testing the TiP hypothesis, as impaired 
performance on verbal-only tasks is unlikely to inform us about what mental representations an 
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individual who thinks in pictures is using; for instance, such individuals may not be recruiting 
any task-relevant representations at all.  Also, data from these tasks will not be very useful as a 
point of distinction between the TiP hypothesis and other deficit accounts of autism.  However, 
this TiP prediction is consistent with general evidence for verbal impairments in autism (DSM-
IV-TR, 2000), though the precise relationship remains to be determined. 
Regarding the second prediction, that individuals with autism use visual strategies to 
solve tasks that are also typically solved visually, a conservative claim might be that the visual 
strategies used by the two groups are the same, and therefore no behavioral differences in either 
task performance or strategy selection ought to be observed.  However, there is significant 
evidence for behavioral differences in autism on typically visual tasks, ranging from changes in 
low-level perception (e.g. Bertone et al., 2005) to superior performance on certain visual tasks 
like the Embedded Figures Task (e.g. Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997).  One possible TiP 
explanation of these differences is that a bias towards using visual representations leads to a 
general “visual expertise” not shared by TD individuals.  However, these findings can also been 
interpreted as indications of atypical cognitive processing, for example of greater detail-oriented 
processing (Happé & Frith, 2006) or superior low-level perceptual abilities (Mottron et al., 
2006).  If such processing differences are an integral aspect of autism, one important question for 
TiP will be how such differences might be related to a bias towards visual representations.  In 
general, data from typically visual tasks are not necessarily the best test of the TiP hypothesis, as 
they alone cannot distinguish between the TiP account and other cognitive theories that posit 
superior visual processing in autism. 
The third prediction, regarding tasks typically solved verbally that can also be solved 
visually, is the most useful for directly testing the TiP hypothesis.  In particular, for a given task 
in this category, it should be possible to design experiments that illuminate whether the 
underlying representational strategy used by an individual is visual or verbal.  Furthermore, 
experiments testing this third TiP prediction will provide the surest means for distinguishing TiP 
from other cognitive theories of autism, as (insofar as we have seen) no other cognitive account 
explicitly posits visual/verbal representational differences. 
 
 
Table 1.  General behavioral predictions for autism from the TiP hypothesis 
 
Prediction 















tasks that can only 
be done verbally 
verbal successful visual impaired 
P2 in TA 
tasks typically done 
visually 
visual successful visual successful 
P3 in TB  ∩ A 
tasks typically done 
verbally that can be 
done visually 
verbal successful visual successful 
 
Note.  AU = Individuals with autism; TD = Typically developing individuals.
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In the following two sections, we review empirical data related to the third and second 
TiP predictions, respectively.  In particular, we look at: 
• Tasks typically done verbally that can be done visually:  (1) the n-back task, (2) serial 
recall, (3) dual task studies, (4) Raven’s Progressive Matrices, (5) semantic processing, 
and (6) false belief tasks. 




TiP Prediction #3:  Tasks Typically Done Verbally That Can Be Done Visually 
 
The n-Back Task 
 
In the n-back task (Kirchner, 1958), a subject is presented with a sequence of stimuli and asked 
whether the current stimulus matches the one shown n steps ago.  The variable n can take the 
value of one (respond “yes” to any succession of two identical stimuli), two (respond “yes” to 
any stimulus matching the one presented two steps back), and so on.  Stimuli can vary as to their 
content and presentation, such as letters presented visually or auditorily, pictures, etc. 
For TD individuals, the n-back task is thought to recruit verbal rehearsal processes in 
working memory (i.e. phonological verbal representations), among other executive resources 
(Smith & Jonides, 1999).  Several published studies of the n-back task have not shown 
significant differences in accuracy or reaction time for individuals with autism relative to TD 
controls (see Appendix A), which has led, in some cases, to the conclusion that verbal working 
memory is intact in autism (Williams, Goldstein, Carpenter, & Minshew, 2005). 
However, recent fMRI studies have shown that, while behavioral measures on the n-back 
task may be similar, there can be significant differences in patterns of brain activation between 
individuals with autism and TD controls.  In one study using stimuli of visually presented letters, 
the autism group showed less brain activation than controls in left prefrontal and parietal regions 
associated with verbal processing and greater activation in right hemisphere and posterior 
regions associated with visual processing (Koshino et al., 2005).  In another study using stimuli 
of photographs of faces, a similar decrease in left prefrontal activation was found in the autism 
group (Koshino et al., 2008).  These studies suggest that individuals with autism may be using a 




In serial recall tasks, a subject is presented with a sequence of randomly ordered stimuli and then 
asked to reproduce the sequence in order, after a short delay.  These tasks generally involve the 
visual or auditory presentation of letters, numbers, words, or pictures, after which the subject has 
to verbally repeat the sequence or point to items in the correct order. 
For TD individuals, serial recall tasks are thought to recruit primarily verbal rehearsal 
processes in working memory (i.e. phonological verbal representations), for instance as 
evidenced by decreased memory spans for long words—the word length effect—or for 
phonologically similar items—the phonological similarity effect (Baddeley, 2003).  These verbal 
effects are seen even with visually presented stimuli in TD children above seven years of age, 
suggesting that in later development, TD individuals tend to recode visual stimuli into a verbal 
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form (Hitch, Halliday, Dodd, & Littler, 1989).  In younger TD children, there is evidence for 
visual (and not verbal) encoding of visual stimuli in the form of decreased memory spans for 
visually similar items—the visual similarity effect (Hitch, Woodin, & Baker, 1989). 
Several published studies on serial recall tasks show no significant group differences in 
overall performance between individuals with autism and controls (see Appendix B).  As with 
the n-back task, these data are often used to indicate intact verbal working memory in autism.  
For example, standardized tests such as the WISC and the WRAML use number and letter span 
subtests as components of verbal IQ, and individuals with autism have often shown peaks of 
ability on these particular subtests (Siegel et al., 1996).  However, additional behavioral data, 
such as the presence or absence of the word length or similarity effects described in the previous 
paragraph, should be considered to determine what strategy an individual is actually using. 
Two studies have examined the robustness of the word length effect in individuals with 
autism.  Russell, Jarrold, and Henry (1996) found, for auditorily presented stimuli, no difference 
in word length effect in a verbal response condition between children with autism and TD 
controls as well as a group with moderate learning disabilities, but, oddly, the autism group’s 
word length effect actually increased in a nonverbal (pointing) response condition.  Whitehouse 
et al. (2006) used visually presented stimuli with verbal responses and found a smaller word 
length effect in the autism group than in TD controls.  Also, the word length effect increased in 
the autism group in an overt labeling condition, indicating that the autism group may have relied 
to a lesser extent on verbal encoding than controls when not biased to do so by producing labels.   
Williams, Happé, and Jarrold (2008) looked at a similar recall task with visually 
presented stimuli and verbal responses and measured the robustness of the phonological 
similarity and visual similarity effects in children with autism and in a control group with 
learning disabilities.  They found no group differences in recall performance, but when subjects 
were divided by their verbal mental age (VMA), those with VMA over seven years had better 
overall recall performance and a significant phonological similarity effect but no visual similarity 
effect, while subjects with VMA less than seven exhibited the opposite pattern.  In other words, 
this study found VMA to better predict strategy use than did diagnostic group, and additional 
analyses found VMA to be a better predictor than cognitive profiles as well (Williams & Jarrold, 
2010).  While the authors of this study did not discount the significance of cognitive profile in 
predicting strategy use, they cautioned against treating it as the only variable of relevance, and 
they also pointed out the importance of looking at variables like VMA and cognitive profile, in 
addition to diagnostic group, in assessing results in experimental studies of autism.  On both of 
these points, we wholeheartedly agree, and the question of how to experimentally identify and 
analyze data from subgroups within the ASD population is central to continued development of 
the TiP hypothesis.  
In summary, many studies have reported individuals with autism achieving similar levels 
of performance on serial recall tasks as TD individuals, but at least some of these studies have 
found evidence of a visual strategy bias in autism. 
 
Dual Task Studies 
 
Dual task studies discern task strategy choices by looking at whether executing a simultaneous 
secondary task interferes with performance (Brooks, 1968).  The basic assumption of the dual-
task paradigm is that, because different cognitive modalities (e.g. visual versus verbal) draw 
upon separate and limited cognitive resources, performing two tasks simultaneously using the 
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same modality will degrade performance more than performing two tasks that use different 
modalities (Jonides et al., 1996; Navon & Gopher, 1979).  Whether a primary task uses a certain 
modality can be determined by finding out whether the simultaneous execution of a secondary 
task known to involve those resources affects performance (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).  
Secondary tasks (a.k.a. suppression tasks) can be very simple, so there is little ambiguity about 
what cognitive resources are being used.  Verbal or articulatory suppression (i.e. recruiting 
phonological verbal representations) often consists of repeating a word out loud.  Visuospatial 
suppression can include holding an image in memory or a simple tapping or pointing task. 
Only a handful of dual task studies have been performed with individuals on the autism 
spectrum, and all have shown results generally consistent with the TiP hypothesis, though not 
necessarily interpreted as such.  García-Villamisar and Della Sala (2002) used a primary task of 
serial recall, with verbal recall of auditorily presented digits, and a secondary suppression task of 
visuomotor tracking, in which subjects had to manually mark a series of boxes on paper.  No 
group differences were found for either task performed singly, but when performed together, the 
autism group showed a significant impairment on both tasks, while the control group showed no 
impairment.  The authors read these results as marking a general deficit in simultaneous task 
performance in autism, but these data could also indicate that the group with autism was using a 
visual strategy for the digit span task, which, unlike the verbal strategy used by controls, was 
open to interference from the visual suppression task.  Moreover, other dual task studies in 
autism have not found evidence of a general dual-tasking deficit (see below). 
Whitehouse et al. (2006) conducted a dual-task experiment in which the primary task was 
task-switching in written arithmetic, in which subjects had to alternately add and subtract pairs of 
numbers, and the secondary task was verbal suppression, with subjects repeating “Monday” out 
loud.  No group differences were found in latency or accuracy in the single-task condition.  
However, the control group showed an increase in latency under articulatory suppression, 
matching previous studies on task switching in TD individuals (Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 
2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003), while the autism group did not.  These results go against the 
idea of a general impairment in dual task performance in autism and also suggest that the autism 
group used a nonverbal (though not necessarily visual) task-switching strategy.  Lidstone, 
Fernyhough, Meins, and Whitehouse (2009) re-analyzed these data divided by cognitive profile 
and found that the lack of a latency increase under articulatory suppression was limited to 
children with autism having a V < NV profile, irrespective of absolute levels of verbal ability.  
Controls with a V < NV profile did show impaired dual task performance under articulatory 
suppression, as did children with a V = NV profile in both groups.  Wallace, Silvers, Martin, and 
Kenworthy (2009) looked at the Tower of London planning task as the primary task, with a 
secondary task of articulatory suppression, and similarly found that the control group showed a 
significant impairment in their primary task performance under articulatory suppression, whereas 
the autism group showed no such impairment.   
Holland and Low (2010) repeated the task switching experiment of Whitehouse et al. 
(2006) but with an added visuospatial suppression task, with subjects tapping out a simple 
pattern on a set of blocks using their non-dominant hand.  As in the study by Whitehouse et al. 
(2006), there were no significant group differences in latency or accuracy in the single-task 
condition.  Dual task results showed that the autism group exhibited an increase in task-
switching latency under visuospatial suppression but not under articulatory suppression, while 
the control group showed a similar latency increase under both suppression conditions.  Similar 
dual-task results were obtained in a second experiment that looked at a Tower of Hanoi planning 
Georgia Tech GVU Technical Report GIT-GVU-10-05 8 
 
task.  These data seem to suggest that the autism group used visuospatial but not verbal resources 
for task-switching and planning, while controls used both visuospatial and verbal resources for 
both tasks.  However, in the task-switching experiment, both groups also showed an increase in 
latency under visuospatial suppression for a baseline, non-task-switching version of the 
arithmetic task, suggesting that the visuospatial suppression task may have interfered with 
peripheral, non-task-switching demands of the primary task.  For instance, the visuomotor 
demands of tapping blocks with the non-dominant hand while writing arithmetic answers with 
the dominant hand may have been in contention, in which case the visuospatial suppression task 
did not really target high-level task-switching resources. 
While none of these dual-task studies taken singly provides a definitive test of the TiP 
hypothesis, together they are highly suggestive of individuals with autism using visual strategies 
for certain tasks that are typically done verbally.  We return to the appropriateness of using dual-
task studies for testing the TiP hypothesis in our discussion, where we outline a framework for 
generating a specific set of testable TiP predictions using this paradigm. 
 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) is a standardized intelligence test that consists of problems 
resembling geometric analogies, in which a matrix of figures is presented with one entry missing 
and the correct missing entry must be selected from among a set of answer choices (Raven, 




Figure 2.  Example problem similar to one in Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. 
Although the test is only supposed to measure eductive ability, or the ability to extract 
and understand information from a complex situation, factor analyses have shown the RPM to be 
a good measure of Spearman’s g, and it is thus widely used as a general intelligence test (Raven, 
Raven, & Court, 2003).  Using the RPM as a measure of general intelligence, though it consists 
only of problems in a single format, stands in contrast to using broader tests like the Wechsler 
scales, which contain subtests across several different domains. 
Whereas the RPM scores of TD individuals are usually correlated with their Wechsler IQ 
scores, individuals with autism have demonstrated RPM scores much higher than their Wechsler 
scores (Bölte, Dziobek, & Poustka, 2009; Dawson, Soulieres, Gernsbacher, & Mottron, 2007; 
Mottron, 2004).  Individuals with Asperger’s have shown a similar pattern (Hayashi, Kato, 
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Igarashi, & Kashima, 2008).  One possible explanation for these results is that the RPM, in 
which both questions and answers are presented visually, might be amenable to solution using 
visual strategies.  The Wechsler scales, on the other hand, are heavily verbal, and while 
individuals with autism often show good performance on certain subtests like Digit Span or 
Block Design, their performance on the other subtests can be much lower.  If TD individuals use 
a combination of visual and verbal strategies on both types of tests, then scores between the two 
paradigms should be correlated.  
One widely cited computational modeling study proposes that TD individuals use a 
propositional, rule-based strategy to solve RPM problems (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990).  
However, Hunt (1974) proposed the existence of two qualitatively distinct strategies:  one visual, 
using perceptual operations like visual continuity and superposition, and one analytic, using 
formal operations based on logical rules.  Several behavioral studies of TD individuals point to 
the possibility of distinct visual and verbal strategies being effective on the RPM (DeShon, Chan, 
& Weissbein, 1995; Lynn, Allik, & Irwing, 2004; van der Ven & Ellis, 2000), and we are 
currently conducting computational studies to investigate whether visual-only algorithms can, in 
fact, successfully solve the RPM (Kunda, McGreggor, & Goel, 2010a, 2010b). 
Soulières et al. (2009) recently found, using fMRI, that individuals with autism had lower 
brain activation in verbal prefrontal and parietal areas and higher activation in visual occipital 
areas than TD controls while solving the RPM, consistent with the notion of a visual strategy-
bias in autism.  On a related but non-RPM set of matrix reasoning tasks, Sahyoun, Soulières, 
Belliveau, Mottron, and Mody (2009) found evidence through measures of response latency of 
the autism group having a bias towards visuospatial mediation, whereas TD individuals and 




Evidence from neuropsychology has suggested that visual and verbal semantic memory are 
somewhat dissociated, in that brain lesions can selectively impair the use of one or the other 
(Hart & Gordon, 1992).  However, whether this dissociation reflects two separate, modality-
specific semantic stores or a single store with multiple, modality-specific access schemes is 
unclear (Caramazza, 1996; Farah & McClelland, 1991).  Either way, under the TiP hypothesis, 
we predict that individuals with autism have privileged or primary access to visual semantic 
information, whereas TD individuals are capable of accessing both visual and verbal semantics. 
In one well-designed fMRI study, Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, and Just (2006) 
studied brain activation in individuals with autism and TD individuals when they had to answer 
true/false questions about high or low imagery sentences.  High imagery sentences included 
statements like, “The number eight when rotated 90 degrees looks like a pair of eyeglasses,” 
while low imagery sentences included statements like, “Addition, subtraction, and multiplication 
are all math skills.”  One way to conceptualize these two classes of stimuli is as follows:   
(a) High imagery sentences require semantic understanding plus visual reasoning.   
(b) Low imagery sentences require semantic understanding only. 
The control group showed a significant difference between the high and low imagery conditions, 
with the high imagery condition eliciting more activity from temporal and parietal regions 
associated with mental imagery as well as from inferior frontal regions associated with verbal 
processing.  This pattern fits the model that visual regions are used for visual reasoning, while 
verbal regions are used for lexical and semantic processing.  (The baseline used for both 
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conditions was a fixation task that involved no linguistic processing.)  In contrast, the autism 
group showed similar activation in both conditions, with less activity in inferior frontal language 
regions than the control group in the high imagery condition, and greater activity in occipital and 
parietal visual regions in the low imagery condition.  This pattern suggests that the individuals 
with autism may have used visual regions for both visual reasoning and semantic processing. 
Many other studies have found significant differences in brain activity during semantic 
processing tasks between individuals with autism and TD controls, although the precise patterns 
of results have varied.  Like the study by Kana et al. (2006), Gaffrey et al. (2007) found 
increased activation in posterior visual regions and decreased activation in frontal verbal regions 
for individuals with ASD during a task of determining whether a word belonged to certain 
semantic categories (i.e. tools, colors, and feelings), with a baseline perceptual processing task.  
However, Just, Cherkassky, Keller, and Minshew (2004), in a study of sentence comprehension 
with a fixation baseline, found reduced activity in visual, occipito-parietal regions in subjects 
with autism compared to TD controls, though the autism group did also show decreased activity 
in frontal language regions.  Harris et al. (2006) found similar results of reduced frontal language 
region activation in an ASD group compared to TD controls during a word judging task with a 
perceptual processing baseline, and also found that the ASD group showed more similar 
activation in some language regions between the semantic and perceptual tasks than did the 
control group.  Finally, Knaus, Silver, Lindgren, Hadjikhani, and Tager-Flusberg (2008) used a 
response-naming task with a perceptual processing baseline and found that subjects with ASD 
had more activation in frontal and temporal language areas than did TD controls. 
One important factor in neuroimaging studies of semantic processing is the choice of a 
baseline task.  For TD individuals, lexical-semantic tasks are often paired with perceptual 
processing tasks that use letter or word stimuli, to remove any perceptual components of the 
semantic understanding process.  However, if a subject uses visual neural machinery to do 
semantic processing, then it is possible that subtracting the brain activation due to a perceptual 
processing task may remove semantic-associated activation in visual regions as well. 
In addition to these neuroimaging studies, several behavioral studies have also looked at 
semantic processing in individuals with autism.  Kamio and Toichi (2000) used a word-
completion task in which semantic priming was provided using either picture or word cues.  TD 
controls performed similarly under both conditions, but the autism group performed much better 
with picture cues than word cues, suggesting that they were better able to retrieve verbal 
information through pictorial representations than through other verbal representations.  Lopez 
and Leekam (2003) found that children with autism were as capable as TD controls of using 
visual semantic context to facilitate object identification; the same pattern was found for verbal 
semantic information, though ceiling effects were a possible confound in the verbal case. 
In summary, while existing data are mixed, current modality-specific models of semantic 
memory (whether modality-specific in indexing alone or in storage as well) make semantic 
processing a good candidate for further testing of the TiP hypothesis. 
 
False Belief Tasks 
 
False belief tasks represent one experimental paradigm for testing theory of mind abilities, which 
center on the attribution of mentalistic or belief states to external entities.  Theory of mind, in 
turn, represents one component of social cognition.  False belief tasks represent a domain that is 
widely found to be impaired among individuals on the autism spectrum (see review in Happé, 
1995), and deficits in theory of mind (e.g. Mindblindness) and other aspects of social cognition 
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have been suggested to be a central facet of autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen & 
Belmonte, 2005).   
One classic test of false belief understanding is the Sally-Anne task (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983), in which the subject is shown a skit with two dolls, Sally and Anne.  Sally places a marble 
into a basket and, after Anne leaves the room, moves the marble from the basket into a box.  The 
subject is then asked where Anne will look for the marble when she returns.  Responding 
correctly, that Anne will look in the basket, requires an understanding of Anne’s false belief that 
the marble is still in the basket; Anne’s belief is false in that it represents something that the 
subject watching the skit knows is not true. 
Many interpretations of false belief task performance in autism posit that there is some 
fundamentally social deficit that leads to impaired theory of mind abilities (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 
1995).  We investigate one contrasting view, namely that false belief impairments in autism stem 
from a domain-general bias against using verbal representations, not from a domain-specific 
difference in social cognition.  In particular, verbal mental age has been found to be strongly 
correlated with performance on false belief tasks in both individuals with autism and in TD 
controls (Happé, 1995; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998).  While this pattern 
seems amenable to a straightforward TiP interpretation, it raises the question of precisely how 
verbal mental representations might be related to false belief tasks.  One possibility is that 
standard false belief tasks, which require explicit language comprehension and responding, 
overtax the weak language skills of individuals with autism.  However, individuals with autism 
also show impairments on nonverbal analogues of false-belief tasks such as eye-tracking studies, 
making this explanation unlikely (Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009; Senju et al., 2010). 
A second possibility is that linguistic verbal mental representations are required for 
developing concepts of false belief, on which both verbal and nonverbal versions of false-belief 
tasks rely (e.g. Fernyhough, 2008).  However, two-year-old TD infants exhibit visual attentional 
patterns that seem to draw upon an understanding of false beliefs before significant linguistic 
abilities have developed (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007).  While there is almost certainly a 
strong connection between linguistic representations and theory of mind abilities, these types of 
eye-tracking studies cast doubt on whether the relationship is strictly causal and sequential. 
A third possibility, which we espouse, is that verbal representations are, after all, used to 
form false belief concepts, but where “verbal” in this case refers to propositional representations, 
not linguistic representations.  Propositions can be thought of as the building blocks of a low-
level representational system, where a single proposition takes the form of a related set of 
symbols that carries semantic meaning.  Linguistic representations occur at a much higher level 
of abstraction than propositions and are explicitly tied to a particular language. 
The idea of false belief impairments in autism having a low-level representational origin 
is not new; the development of false belief concepts has been described as requiring, for 
instance, the representation of “complements” (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2003; Hale & Tager-
Flusberg, 2003) or “metarepresentation” (Leslie, 1987).  The gist of these arguments is that, in 
order to represent a false belief, an individual must have some mechanism for representing a 
belief as being held to be true in one context (e.g. by an agent in a story), alongside the property 
of its being false in a different context (e.g. in the story itself).  Recent modeling work in 
cognitive architectures has found that this type of information can be easily represented using 
propositions (Bello & Cassimatis, 2006).   
From this perspective, individual performance on social/mental and non-mental versions 
of false belief tasks should be correlated.  While for a time, several visual tasks such as the false 
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photograph, false map, and false drawing tasks were thought to be appropriate non-mental 
analogues of false belief tasks (e.g. Leekam & Perner, 1991; Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992; 
Leslie & Thaiss, 1992), Perner and Leekam (2008) have argued that these tasks do not tap the 
same representational structure as standard false belief tasks.  Instead, they propose that the false 
sign (or false signal) task is the more appropriate non-mental analogue, and in support of their 
claim, correlated patterns of impairments have been observed in autism on the false signal task 
and standard false belief tasks (Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005).  These 
results support the view of false belief competency being more a function of domain-general 
representational ability than of domain-specific social ability.  
Perner and Leekam (2008) suggested that standard visual false-item tasks, such as the 
false map and false photograph tasks, tap into visual reasoning abilities that develop 
independently of false-belief-type representational abilities.  Figure 3 gives a summary of results 
from studies (detailed in Appendix C) that compared the performance of individuals with autism 
on visual false-item tasks with their performance on standard false belief tasks.  These data, 
along with similar results on other visual tasks such as matching the state of a true model or 
photograph to a room (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1995) and visual perspective taking (Reed & 
Peterson, 1990), suggest that many individuals with autism who show impaired performance on 
false belief tasks can exhibit intact or superior performance on tasks of comparable complexity 
that tap into visual instead of propositional reasoning.  TD individuals, in contrast, seem equally 
predisposed towards having strengths on either one or the other (or both) of these task types, 
which we would expect if they emerge independently in normal development.  
If false belief impairments in autism are due to deficits in the underlying propositional 
representations, then false belief tasks may seem to fall under the first TiP prediction, that 
individuals with autism will show poor performance on tasks only solvable verbally.  However, 
there has been some recent success in helping individuals with autism represent false belief 
concepts visually, for instance using thought bubbles or photograph-in-the-head analogies 
(McGregor, Whiten, & Blackburn, 1998a, 1998b; Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez, & Walsh, 
1996; Wellman et al., 2002).  These studies have generally shown positive results in teaching 
subjects to pass specific false belief tasks but less so in leading subjects to transfer their 
knowledge to new tasks.   
 
 
TiP Prediction #2:  Tasks Typically Done Visually 
 
Unlike the tasks discussed previously, which are typically done verbally but might be amenable 
to visual strategies, we now discuss empirical data related to the second TiP prediction, on tasks 
that are done visually both by TD individuals and by individuals with autism.  As described 
earlier, while the TiP hypothesis provides a good explanation of why individuals with autism 
might show intact performance on these types of tasks, it does not provide a straightforward 
explanation of why they might show superior performance, and it is inconsistent with evidence 









Figure 3.  Summary of results from published studies of standard false belief versus visual 
false-item tasks in TD and learning disabled individuals (top) or individuals with autism 
(bottom).  Each data point represents the performance of a single group, as indexed in the 
legend, on the visual versus false belief tasks.  Numbers within each data point refer to the 
experiment number in Table 4, which contains demographic and experimental design 
information.  Note that this figure is intended as a qualitative illustration of trends in 
published data and not as a strict quantitative analysis. 
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Visual Search and Attention 
 
One widely reported area of superior performance for individuals on the autism spectrum is 
visual search.  For example, individuals on the spectrum have repeatedly demonstrated more 
accurate and/or more efficient performance on the Embedded Figures Task (EFT), in which a 
small figure must be located within a larger, more complex one (see review in Happé & Frith, 
2006).  Several recent papers have looked at classic target/distracter visual search tasks and have 
found similar patterns of superior performance by individuals on the autism spectrum, often 
through faster response latencies (see Appendix D).  Moreover, faster search performance in 
autism often grows more pronounced with more difficult search tasks, e.g. for conjunctive vs. 
feature search trials, etc. 
Studies of the EFT using fMRI have shown that individuals with autism tend to recruit 
more occipital visual processing brain regions for this task, whereas TD controls recruit more 
frontal and parietal working memory regions (Manjaly et al., 2007; Ring et al., 1999).  However, 
one study of a target/distracter search task found increased activation in individuals on the autism 
spectrum compared to TD controls in both frontoparietal and occipital regions and also that, 
while patterns of activation differed for controls between an easy feature search task and a more 
difficult one, no such differences were found for the autism group (Keehn, Brenner, Palmer, 
Lincoln, & Müller, 2008).  In addition, significant group differences in eye-movement patterns 
(Keehn et al., 2009) and in sensitivity to task parameters (Baldassi et al., 2009) have been found 
on visual search tasks.  These results are often explained by theories that posit processing 
strengths in autism, e.g. a local processing bias (Happé & Frith, 2006) or enhanced low-level 
perception (Mottron et al., 2006).  However, these results are also not inconsistent with the TiP 
hypothesis, and might also be explained by the emergence in autism of visual expertise, 
stemming from a basic bias towards using visual representations.   
In general, that there are significant and widespread differences between individuals on 
the autism spectrum and TD individuals on visual search tasks and in overall patterns of visual 
attention seems to be well established, and these differences seem to developmentally precede 
many other cognitive processes (Brenner, Turner, & Müller, 2007).  Specific relationships 
between the TiP hypothesis and visual search and attention remain to be determined, especially 




Serial spatial recall tasks are a part of many standardized intelligence tests, such as Finger 
Windows in the WRAML.  These tasks involve the presentation of a sequence of spatial 
locations (e.g. holes on a card or blocks on a table), which the subject has to manually reproduce.  
Another type of spatial recall task uses self-ordered pointing, in which the subject must point to 
locations not previously selected.  Both paradigms require the subject to reproduce a set or 
sequence of spatial locations.  Individuals with autism often, but not always, show impaired 
performance on these types of tasks, and we found no study of spatial recall on which the autism 
group showed superior performance (see Appendix E). 
Given that serial recall for items or objects appears to be unimpaired in autism, as 
discussed earlier, there appears to be a dissociation between how well individuals with autism 
can remember visually discriminable items vs. visually indiscriminable spatial locations.  
Although these results seem to contradict the TiP hypothesis, one explanation could be that the 
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visual representations used by individuals with autism do not, by themselves, represent spatial 
information adequately.  In line with this idea, on tasks that combine visual and spatial 
information (i.e. recalling the locations of visually discriminable stimuli), individuals with 
autism have shown intact performance (Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001; Williams et al., 2006).   
Another possibility might be that spatial recall tasks actually recruit verbal working 
memory; correlations between spatial span and speech rate have been found in TD individuals, 
without similar correlations between spatial span and tapping or spatial movement rate (Chuah & 
Maybery, 1999; Smyth & Scholey, 1992, 1996).  Studies have also found that articulatory 
suppression can interfere with spatial span tasks (Jones, Farrand, Stuart, & Morris, 1995; Smyth, 




One paradigm for tests of visual recall involves giving the subject an abstract design to draw 
from memory after an initial inspection.  Two examples are the Benton Visual Retention Test 
and the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Task.  The Rey-Osterrieth task includes a copy condition 
that helps to identify perceptual or motor impairments that could confound results. 
Many studies of these types of tasks have revealed decreased performance in individuals 
with autism (see Appendix F).  Given the patterns of intact and even superior performance found 
in other visual domains, these visual recall data are rather puzzling.  Moreover, both the Rey and 
Benton tests have been found, in TD individuals, to be correlated with the Block Design subtest 
of the Wechsler scales and not correlated with verbal measures (Mitrushina, Boone, & Razani, 
2005; Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006), and the Block Design subtest has been commonly 
cited as an area of particular strength for individuals with autism (Siegel et al., 1996). 
One explanation could be that perceptual and motor components of these drawing tasks 
are what cause difficulties for individuals with autism rather than the memory requirements per 
se.  Ropar and Mitchell (2001) examined this possibility by comparing differences in copy and 
recall scores among experimental groups, instead of just looking at recall scores, and found no 
group differences between TD controls and subjects with autism or Asperger’s.  Alternately, 
individuals with autism could have difficulty on the spatial but not visual aspects of these tasks.  
Although the Rey-Osterrieth task is often described as a test of visual memory, the task contains 
both visual and spatial components that are somewhat dissociable (Breier et al., 1996). 
As with spatial recall, data on visual recall for individuals with autism are mixed at best.  
It is unclear how these results might be accounted for by the TiP hypothesis, and more detailed 
investigations are needed of what specific cognitive processes both individuals with autism and 





We have presented detailed reviews of empirical data on individuals with autism from several 
different task domains.  For each task, we have attempted to give an objective assessment of 
whether the data are consistent with our formulation of a Thinking in Pictures (TiP) hypothesis 
about cognition in autism.  As expected, the results of this analysis are mixed.  Certain task 
domains offer evidence that is highly consistent with and well explained by the TiP hypothesis, 
including:  (1) the n-back task, (2) serial recall, (3) dual tasking, (4) Raven’s Progressive 
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Matrices, (5) semantic processing, and (6) false belief tasks.  Other task domains, while not 
inconsistent with the TiP hypothesis, are not directly explained by it either, namely:  (7) visual 
search and attention.  Finally, there are task domains whose data seem to contradict the TiP 
hypothesis, which are:  (8) spatial recall, and (9) visual recall. 
Of course, there are many experimental task paradigms that we have not addressed or 
have only briefly touched upon, for instance free recall, cued recall, visual or verbal recognition, 
executive functioning, etc.   However, the main point that we wish to convey is that, across 
several task domains, there is a significant amount of evidence that is highly consistent with the 
TiP hypothesis.  This finding is even more interesting given that most of the studies we reviewed 
did not explicitly use a visual/verbal hypothesis in the design or execution of their experiments.   
In the remainder of this section, we present one experimental avenue for making 
concrete, testable predictions using the TiP hypothesis, and then we discuss the relationship of 
the TiP hypothesis to existing cognitive accounts of autism.  We close with our final thoughts on 
TiP and important questions for further exploration. 
 
Testable Predictions of the TiP Hypothesis 
 
The TiP hypothesis offers significant predictive power, given appropriately chosen task domains 
and carefully designed experiments.  In this section, we describe one example set of TiP 
predictions using a generalized dual task paradigm.  Dual task studies offer a good test of the TiP 
hypothesis, because their results can clearly indicate, for a particular individual or group, 
whether visual or verbal cognitive resources are necessary for a given task.  To review, dual task 
studies use suppression tasks to tie up cognitive resources in a given modality to determine 
whether that modality is necessary for the completion of some primary task. 
Across a range of primary tasks typically done verbally (tasks for which controls show 
impairments under verbal but not visual suppression), the TiP hypothesis predicts that 
individuals with autism will show impairments under visual but not verbal suppression.  One 
example of a primary task (e.g. as used in Garcia-Villamisar & Della Sala, 2002) might be serial 
recall, which is a task that seems amenable to being solved either visually or verbally.   
However, while data fulfilling these TiP predictions would indicate that a suppression 
task interferes with some portion of the primary task, they do not specify which portion.  For 
instance, performing a serial recall task involves much more than just remembering the digits 
that are presented; perceptual processes are involved in detecting and decoding the auditory 
inputs, attention must select those particular inputs for processing, the motor machinery of 
speech production must be used to verbally articulate the outputs, etc.  Certain suppression tasks 
might interfere with serial recall through one of these peripheral pathways, without affecting the 
actual short-term memory processes that are usually denoted as belonging to “serial recall” 
(Navon & Gopher, 1979).  To take a trivial example, suppose a verbal suppression task of 
repeating out loud the days of the week were to be used in concordance with a serial recall task 
with spoken outputs.  Obviously, a participant trying to articulate both the days of the week and a 
list of digits simultaneously would experience some delays in producing answers, if not outright 
difficulties, but these performance decrements arising from simple interference between the two 
overt articulation tasks would likely mask the presence or absence of interference in the actual 
serial memory demands of the two tasks.  This issue seemed to arise in the dual task study of 
Holland and Low (2009), in which the tapping task used for visual suppression might have 
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interfered with the motor demands of doing written arithmetic, irrespective of the higher-level 
cognitive processes used for each task. 
For this reason, the dual task experiment should also include a baseline task (e.g. Holland 
& Low, 2009; Whitehouse et al., 2006).  This baseline should be selected to involve all of the 
peripheral cognitive processes recruited for the primary task, except for the key defining process 
of the primary task itself.  For example, a baseline for serial recall could be repeating a very 
easily remembered series of digits (like, “3, 5, 3, 5, 3, 5”), which presumably uses all of the same 
perceptual, attentional, and speech processes as serial recall but does not load as heavily on the 
actual memory requirements.  It follows that any interference between the primary task and the 
suppression task not matched by similar interference between the baseline and the 
suppression task can be interpreted as stemming from the specific, definitional demands of the 
primary task, and not from any peripheral cognitive demands (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).  This 
approach is analogous to the task subtraction methodology used in neuroimaging experiments, in 
which brain activation that occurs with one task but not with another is assumed to correspond 
directly to the differing cognitive demands of each task. 
Using this framework, we can outline the general predictions that arise from the TiP 
hypothesis.  Consider a particular choice of primary task (TASK A) that we hypothesize is done 
verbally by TD individuals and visually by individuals with autism, along with a baseline task 
(BASE), visual suppression task (VIS), and verbal suppression task (VERB).  Then, assuming 
that both the autism group and the TD group are able to perform all of these tasks singly at some 
level of performance, we predict that: 
1) Under visual suppression (+ VIS): 
a) The TD group will show the same level of impairment on TASK A as on BASE.   
b) The ASD group will show a greater impairment on TASK A than on BASE. 
2) Under verbal suppression (+ VERB): 
a) The TD group will show a greater impairment on TASK A than on BASE.   
b) The ASD group will show the same level of impairment on TASK A as on BASE. 
These predictions are illustrated in Figure 3. Note that this graph assumes that there is no group 
difference on any task performed singly and also that neither group shows suppression effects on 
the baseline task, both of which are assumptions that need not be met in order for the TiP 




Figure 3.  Generalized dual-task behavioral predictions using the TiP hypothesis.  
Components include the primary task (TASK A), a baseline task (BASE), and visual (VIS) 
and verbal (VERB) suppression tasks. 
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Theories of Cognition in Autism 
 
Several existing cognitive theories of autism aim to explain various aspects of autistic behavior.  
We briefly discuss three of these theories here—Executive Dysfunction, Weak Central 
Coherence, and Enhanced Perceptual Functioning—focusing on how the TiP hypothesis relates 
to them, on points of congruence as well as divergence.  (Possible relationships of TiP to a fourth 
theory, Mindblindness, were covered in the section describing false belief tasks.) 
The Executive Dysfunction (ED) theory posits that autism is characterized by 
impairments in a set of higher-level cognitive skills that underlie independent, goal-oriented 
behavior, such as planning, set-shifting, and generativity (Russell, 1997).  We argue that 
evidence in support of the ED theory is consistent with the TiP hypothesis if the specific 
executive capacities found to be impaired in autism are those that cannot be performed using 
visual mental representations.  For example, individuals with autism are often impaired on the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), a test of set-shifting in which subjects must maintain 
knowledge of a sorting rule and then switch the rule as needed (see review in Hill, 2004).  The 
WCST, however, has been found to rely heavily on language abilities and verbal working 
memory in TD individuals (Baldo et al., 2005).  More generally, Russell, Jarrold, and Hood 
(1999) propose that individuals with autism may have trouble primarily with executive tasks that 
require the implicit verbal encoding of rules.  However, despite these suggestive pieces of data, 
evaluating a potential link between executive functioning in autism and the TiP hypothesis will 
require a close re-examination of a wide range of tasks used to tap executive abilities to discern 
how they fit into the task decomposition presented earlier (i.e. can they be solved visually, 
verbally, or using either type of mental representation).   
The Weak Central Coherence (WCC) theory suggests that individuals with autism may 
exhibit a bias towards local over global processing (Happé & Frith, 2006).  Much of the evidence 
for the WCC theory shows patterns of either poor performance in individuals with autism on 
tasks that are said to rely on global processing of stimuli, or intact or superior performance on 
tasks that are said to rely on local processing.  However, at least some of the “local” tasks cited 
by the WCC theory are visual, e.g. embedded figures, block design, visual search, etc.  Likewise, 
certain WCC “global” tasks are verbal, e.g. homograph pronunciation.  For at least these tasks, 
the TiP hypothesis can provide an explanation that is consistent with published data, although, as 
mentioned earlier, the TiP hypothesis does not currently provide a concrete explanation of 
autistic superiorities on certain tasks, beyond our speculation that a reliance on visual 
representations might lead to increased visual expertise.  Moreover, the WCC literature has 
identified several non-visual local tasks that are also performed well by individuals with autism, 
such as pitch and melody perception (see review in Happé & Frith, 2006).  The TiP hypothesis 
is, at present, silent about representational modalities other than visual or verbal, though these 
results raise the question of whether TiP can (or should) be extended to a more general 
perceptual/verbal distinction. 
Along these lines, the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF) theory proposes that 
individuals with autism have enhanced low level perceptual processing across a variety of 
modalities, in contrast to cognitive processing that involves higher levels of neural integration 
(Mottron et al., 2006).  For instance, several studies have found evidence of atypicalities, and 
often superiorities, in low-level visual perception in autism (e.g. Bertone et al., 2005; 
Vandenbroucke et al., 2008).  In addition to low-level perceptual enhancements and atypicalities, 
Ropar and Mitchell (2002) have proposed that autistic perception can be characterized, at least in 
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certain task domains, as being less influenced than in TD individuals by “top-down” cognitive 
processes that draw upon prior conceptual knowledge.  Caron, Mottron, Berthiaume, and 
Dawson (2006) suggest that a combination of locally oriented processing and enhanced 
perceptual processing leads to superiorities in autism on visual tasks, for the subgroup of autism 
that shares these two traits.   
Unlike the TiP hypothesis, which at present focuses only on visual representations, EPF 
and other perceptual accounts of autism are stated broadly to encompass a variety of perceptual 
modalities.  However, within consideration of the visual modality, there seems to be significant 
overlap between these accounts, especially in that both TiP and EPF propose “a successful, 
problem-solving use of perceptual [brain] areas” (Mottron et al., 2006).  Also, inasmuch as 
working with verbal representations might fall under “high-level” cognition, additional overlaps 
between TiP and EPF are likely.   
One major difference between the WCC and EPF theories and the TiP hypothesis is that 
WCC and EPF embody process accounts of cognition, equating various representational 
modalities—visual, auditory, etc.—within each of two distinct types of processing—local vs. 
global, or perceptual vs. high-level.  TiP, on the other hand, embodies a content account of 
cognition, equating various processing types—perception, working memory, long-term memory, 
etc.—within each of two distinct representational modalities—visual vs. verbal.  Another 
difference is that WCC and EPF more explicitly account for autistic superiorities on certain 
visual tasks, whereas TiP does not currently propose a concrete mechanism for this pattern of 
performance, though several possibilities, such as increased visual expertise, remain to be 
explored.  It is plausible that these accounts are linked, both developmentally and cognitively, 
and the precise relationship between the TiP hypothesis and these theories is the subject of some 




Our results lead us to propose two main conclusions.  First, given the existence of so much 
evidence in line with the TiP hypothesis, the idea that certain individuals with autism may “think 
visually” should be taken seriously as a cognitive model and receive more focused and sustained 
attention in behavioral and neurobiological experiments.  Second, and more generally, the 
interpretation of behavioral data from individuals with autism (or, indeed, with any form of 
atypical cognition) should be performed with care.  Assumptions governing the relations 
between cognition and behavior that hold for TD individuals may not hold universally, and we 
have presented several instances in which visual and verbal strategies seem to be used differently 
across experimental groups, despite often producing superficially similar behavior. 
If a subset of individuals on the autism spectrum does have a bias towards using visual 
mental representations, then several important questions remain to be answered about the TiP 
hypothesis.  How might this subset of individuals be identified, and how could experimental 
subgroups be appropriately defined to account for cognitive differences within the autism 
spectrum?  Would these individuals display a V < NV profile, and would such a profile be a 
necessary and sufficient marker of their cognitive style?  What, if anything, would the TiP 
hypothesis tell us about individuals on the spectrum who showed V = NV or V > NV cognitive 
profiles?  At present, we do not have answers to these questions. 
Other important avenues of further inquiry include (1) the accuracy and implications of 
measures of visual and verbal IQ when potential differences in task strategies are taken into 
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account, (2) the distinction, if any, between visual and spatial processing under the TiP account, 
and the relationships between visual and other types of perceptual processing, and (3) how a bias 
away from using verbal representations and towards using visual representations might be 
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b
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 f
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 d
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b
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it
h
 a
u
ti
sm
, 
al
l 
c
o
n
tr
o
l 
g
ro
u
p
s 
T
D
, 
an
d
 N
S
G
D
 i
n
 a
g
e 
o
r 
sh
o
w
n
 I
Q
 m
ea
su
re
s.
G
eo
rg
ia
 T
ec
h
 G
V
U
 T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 R
ep
o
rt
 G
IT
-G
V
U
-1
0
-0
5
 
2
7
 
 A
p
p
en
d
ix
 B
 
 R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
R
es
u
lt
s 
fr
o
m
 P
u
b
li
sh
ed
 S
tu
d
ie
s 
o
f 
S
er
ia
l 
R
ec
a
ll
 T
a
sk
s 
in
 A
u
ti
sm
 
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
 
N
 
A
g
e 
V
IQ
 
P
IQ
 
F
S
IQ
 
It
e
m
s 
P
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
R
es
p
o
n
se
 
R
es
u
lt
s 
A
m
el
i 
et
 a
l.
, 
1
9
8
8
 
1
6
f  
2
2
.7
 
(4
.9
) 
8
1
 (
1
6
) 
9
0
.6
 
(1
3
.5
) 
8
3
 (
1
4
) 
d
ig
it
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 d
ig
it
 s
p
a
n
. 
B
en
n
et
to
, 
P
en
n
in
g
to
n
, 
&
 
R
o
g
er
s,
 1
9
9
6
 
1
9
ac
 
1
5
.9
5
 
(3
.3
) 
8
2
.3
2
 
(1
5
.2
) 
9
8
.1
1
 
(1
5
.9
) 
8
8
.8
9
 
(1
1
.1
) 
d
ig
it
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 d
ig
it
 s
p
a
n
. 
Jo
se
p
h
 e
t 
al
.,
 2
0
0
5
 
2
4
a  
8
.9
 
(2
.3
) 
9
4
 (
1
9
) 
9
9
 (
2
0
) 
9
6
 (
1
8
) 
w
o
rd
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
p
o
in
ti
n
g
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
s.
 
p
ic
tu
re
s 
v
is
u
al
 
se
lf
-o
rd
er
ed
 
p
o
in
ti
n
g
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 e
rr
o
rs
 i
n
 n
o
n
v
er
b
al
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
. 
 
A
U
 h
ad
 m
o
re
 e
rr
o
rs
 i
n
 v
er
b
al
 t
h
an
 
n
o
n
v
er
b
al
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
 a
n
d
 t
h
an
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
. 
M
in
sh
e
w
, 
G
o
ld
st
ei
n
, 
M
u
en
z,
 
&
 P
a
y
to
n
, 
1
9
9
2
 
1
5
 
2
1
.1
3
 
(8
.0
2
) 
9
8
.5
3
 
(2
1
.6
3
) 
9
2
.8
7
 
(1
0
.7
2
) 
9
5
.7
3
 
(1
3
.6
1
) 
d
ig
it
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 d
ig
it
 s
p
a
n
. 
d
ig
it
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
s.
 
M
in
sh
e
w
, 
G
o
ld
st
ei
n
, 
&
 S
ie
g
el
, 
1
9
9
7
 
3
3
 
2
0
.9
1
 
(9
.6
9
) 
1
0
2
.4
8
 
(1
6
.3
5
) 
9
7
.4
5
 
(1
1
.1
9
) 
1
0
0
.0
9
 
(1
2
.9
6
) 
d
ig
it
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 d
ig
it
 s
p
a
n
. 
d
ig
it
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
s.
 
M
in
sh
e
w
 &
 
G
o
ld
st
ei
n
, 
2
0
0
1
 
5
2
 
2
2
.3
3
 
(9
.5
9
) 
9
4
.9
6
 
(1
7
.5
6
) 
9
1
.5
2
 
(1
2
.9
5
) 
9
2
.8
8
 
(1
5
.0
6
) 
le
tt
er
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
se
q
u
en
ce
s.
 
w
o
rd
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
A
U
 i
m
p
ai
re
d
 i
n
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
co
rr
ec
t 
se
q
u
en
ce
s.
 
O
'C
o
n
n
o
r 
&
 
H
er
m
el
in
, 
1
9
6
7
 
1
2
g
 
1
1
.8
 
--
- 
--
- 
--
- 
w
o
rd
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 n
u
m
b
er
 r
ec
al
le
d
. 
 G
re
at
er
 
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 r
ec
en
c
y
 e
ff
ec
ts
 i
n
 A
U
 t
h
a
n
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
. 
p
ic
tu
re
s 
v
is
u
al
 
m
an
u
al
 
o
rd
er
in
g
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 n
u
m
b
er
 r
ec
al
le
d
. 
O
zo
n
o
ff
 &
 S
tr
a
y
er
, 
2
0
0
1
 
2
5
e  
1
2
.9
4
 
(3
.1
8
) 
9
4
.6
 
(1
8
.5
) 
9
9
.3
 
(1
9
.9
) 
9
6
.3
 
(1
7
.8
) 
co
lo
re
d
 
b
o
x
es
 
v
is
u
al
 
se
lf
-o
rd
er
ed
 
p
o
in
ti
n
g
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
er
se
v
er
at
iv
e 
er
ro
rs
, 
w
h
ic
h
 t
en
d
ed
 t
o
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 w
it
h
 
V
IQ
. 
G
eo
rg
ia
 T
ec
h
 G
V
U
 T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 R
ep
o
rt
 G
IT
-G
V
U
-1
0
-0
5
 
2
8
 
 R
u
ss
el
l 
et
 a
l.
, 
1
9
9
6
 
3
3
d
h
 
1
2
.3
8
 
(2
.9
5
) 
--
- 
--
- 
--
- 
w
o
rd
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
, 
p
o
in
ti
n
g
 
M
L
D
 h
ad
 l
o
w
er
 s
p
a
n
 t
h
a
n
 o
th
er
 
g
ro
u
p
s.
  
A
U
 h
ad
 g
re
at
er
 n
o
n
v
er
b
al
 
W
L
E
 t
h
a
n
 v
er
b
al
 W
L
E
 a
n
d
 t
h
an
 M
L
D
 
g
ro
u
p
. 
W
h
it
eh
o
u
se
 e
t 
al
.,
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
3
i  
1
1
 
--
- 
--
- 
--
- 
p
ic
tu
re
s 
v
is
u
al
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
s.
  
A
U
 h
ad
 
sm
al
le
r 
W
L
E
 t
h
a
n
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 a
n
d
 i
n
 
si
le
n
t 
v
s.
 l
ab
el
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
. 
W
il
li
a
m
s 
et
 a
l.
, 
2
0
0
5
 
2
4
 
1
1
.7
5
 
(2
.3
6
) 
1
1
2
.5
0
 
(1
6
.5
3
) 
1
0
6
.3
8
 
(1
4
.2
1
) 
1
0
9
.6
7
 
(1
6
.0
7
) 
d
ig
it
s,
 
le
tt
er
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 s
co
re
. 
 C
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 F
S
IQ
 
in
 A
U
 b
u
t 
n
o
t 
in
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
. 
W
il
li
a
m
s 
et
 a
l.
, 
2
0
0
6
 
3
8
 
1
1
.6
8
 
(2
.4
6
) 
1
0
6
.4
2
 
(1
5
.9
7
) 
1
0
0
.5
5
 
(1
4
.1
9
) 
1
0
3
.8
2
 
(1
4
.2
9
) 
d
ig
it
s,
 
le
tt
er
s 
au
d
it
o
ry
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 s
co
re
. 
W
il
li
a
m
s 
et
 a
l.
, 
2
0
0
8
 
2
5
b
c 
1
2
.2
5
 
(3
.0
8
) 
7
7
.1
6
 
(1
5
.2
5
) 
7
6
.8
4
 
(2
0
.2
7
) 
7
4
.8
4
 
(1
5
.9
9
) 
p
ic
tu
re
s 
v
is
u
al
 
v
er
b
al
 
N
S
G
D
 i
n
 s
p
an
. 
 H
ig
h
 V
M
A
 h
ad
 g
re
at
er
 
P
S
E
 t
h
an
 V
S
E
; 
v
ic
e 
v
er
sa
 f
o
r 
lo
w
 
V
M
A
. 
 N
o
te
. 
 N
 =
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
; 
V
IQ
, 
P
IQ
, 
an
d
 F
S
IQ
 =
 v
er
b
al
, 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
, 
a
n
d
 f
u
ll
-s
ca
le
 I
Q
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
; 
N
S
G
D
 =
 n
o
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
g
ro
u
p
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s;
 A
U
 =
 
au
ti
sm
 g
ro
u
p
; 
M
L
D
 =
 m
il
d
 l
e
ar
n
in
g
 d
is
ab
il
it
ie
s 
g
ro
u
p
; 
W
L
E
, 
P
S
E
, 
an
d
 V
S
E
 =
 w
o
rd
 l
en
g
th
, 
p
h
o
n
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
si
m
il
ar
it
y
, 
an
d
 v
is
u
a
l 
si
m
il
ar
it
y
 e
ff
ec
ts
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
; 
V
M
A
 =
 v
er
b
al
 m
e
n
ta
l 
ag
e.
  
A
g
e 
an
d
 I
Q
 v
al
u
es
 a
re
 s
h
o
w
n
 a
s:
 m
ea
n
 (
st
a
n
d
a
rd
 d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
) 
in
 y
ea
rs
 a
n
d
 s
co
re
s,
 r
es
p
ec
ti
v
e
ly
. 
 A
ll
 s
u
b
je
ct
s 
d
ia
g
n
o
se
d
 w
it
h
 a
u
ti
sm
, 
al
l 
co
n
tr
o
l 
g
ro
u
p
s 
T
D
, 
an
d
 N
S
G
D
 i
n
 a
g
e 
o
r 
sh
o
w
n
 I
Q
 m
ea
su
re
s,
 e
x
ce
p
t 
th
e 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
: 
a  
S
u
b
je
ct
 g
ro
u
p
 d
ia
g
n
o
se
d
 a
s 
a
u
ti
sm
/P
D
D
-N
O
S
. 
 b
 S
u
b
je
ct
 g
ro
u
p
 d
ia
g
n
o
se
d
 a
s 
A
S
D
. 
  
 c
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
g
ro
u
p
 c
o
m
p
ri
se
d
 o
f 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s 
w
it
h
 m
o
d
er
at
e 
le
ar
n
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b
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